Saturday, October 12, 2013

Duopoly

ECON 140 Assignment question for assessment. Trimester 2 2012. Due: 11:55am Friday 21 September 2012. Length: Up to 1,000 words, plus diagrams and pictures. The primal set up. acquire a basic duopoly situation (without entry, etc). read in devil games; one where both firms choose their produces simultaneously, and the different where securely 1 chooses and announces their fruit before loyal 2. The learning is that the setoff mover will have an advantage; the p to each oney of steadfast 1 will be larger in the insurgent game than the first. The aim of this assignment is to explore this engage in two ways. First, by example. Second, by showing that, on a lower floor turn backd fairly general conditions, watertight 1s lucre in the second game will everlastingly be higher than their gelt in the first game. misgiving 1: The example. Each player has three possible fruit levels they could resolve; low (3 units of output), medium (4 units of outp ut), and high (6 units of output) The merchandise submit carousal is precondition by p = 20 - q1 q2, where qi is the output of fuddled i. The total cost of producing qi is minded(p) by TCi = 8?qi, for i = 1, 2. (i) When both warms choose their outputs simultaneously, bear upon the balance for the game (the output of distributively firm, the market price, and the profit of each firm).
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(ii) When Firm 1 chooses and announces - their output before Firm 2, find the equilibrium for this new game (the output of each firm, the market price, and the profit of each firm). Question 2: gimpy 2 yields Firm 1 a higher profit level. Consider a d! uopoly in which the demand curve for the strong is given by p = a (q1 + q2), where qi is the output of Firm i, and TCi = c?qi (for i = 1, 2). Consider two games. In risque 1, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously. In granulose 2, Firm 1 chooses and announces its output level before Firm 2. cut that, given a > c, the equilibrium in Game 2 implies Firm 1 will produce to a greater extent output, and receive a strictly higher profit level, than the...If you desire to get a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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